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In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
SID K. SPENCER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Appeal From the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County 
Hon. Oscar W. 1\IcConkie, Ju.dge 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATE~iENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant was convicted of the crime of Perjury 
in the First Degree. (Tr. 141; Ab. 17). The stat-
ute apparently involved is 
Section 3 of Chapter ·134, Session Laws of 
Utah, 1937, which reads a.s follows: 
"A person is guilty of perjury in the first 
degree who commits perjury as to any 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
material matter in or in connection with 
any action or special proceeding, civil or 
criminal, or any hearing or inquiry involv-
ing the ends of public justice or on an 
occasion in which an oath or affirmation is 
required or may lawfully be administered.'' 
By the complaint of Arthur B. Bringhurst filed 
May 31, 1939, and in the charging portion of the 
same it is alleged: 
"That the said Sid I(. Spencer, at the time 
and place aforesaid, committed perjury by 
testifying as follows: 
'I have not driven a car at any time 
since my license was revoked for 
drunken driving'~'' 
Both appellant and his wife were charged with 
driving an automobile without a driver's license. 
Apparently both charges were made by the same 
arresting officer and based upon the same set of 
circumstances. The charge against Mrs. Spencer 
was later dismissed. 
In Judge Bringhurst's court Sid K. Spencer took 
the witness stand and denied that on the 21st day of 
April, 1939, he was operating or driving an auto-
mobile, but admitted that his license to drive an 
automobile was revoked by the State Tax Commis 
f-lion approximately a year previously. While tes-
tifying in Judge Bringhurst's court and upon a 
query not alleged, it is contended that he made a 
statement specifically as set forth in the Informa-
tion and Bill of Particulars. A.ppellant contends 
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that he did not n1ake such staten1ent. Assun1iug a 
proper interrog-atory, which the record does not 
show, then it is contended that the statement was 
wholly irrelevant and inm1aterial to any n1atter theu 
pending before Judge Bringhurst. 
Spencer was charged "Tith driving an autmnobile 
without a driYer's license. It was not relevant nor 
material to inquire why he did not have a driver's 
license, and any statement that he might have made 
to attempt to explain as to why he did not have a 
license was wholly immaterial to the issue. If 
Spencer had testified that he did have a driver's 
license, when as a matter of fact he did not, that 
-would have been the basis of perjury. 
The Information (Tr. 6; Ab. 1) filed by the District. 
Attorney adopts verbatim the complaint of Bring-
hurst insofar as the charging· part is concerned. 
Thereafter the Disltrict Attorney filed a Bill of 
Particulars as follows: (Tr. 15-16; Ab. 5-6). 
''Comes now the State of Utah and pur-
suant to Section 105-21-9, Chapter 118, 
Laws of Utah, 1935, and hereby makes the 
following Bill of Particulars, towit: 
''That on the 23rd day of April, 1939, the 
defendant herein was charged with the 
crime of violating Section 29, Chapter 45, 
Laws of Utah, 1933, in that he h&d on the 
21st day of April, 1939, in Salt Lake 
County, driven and operated a motor 
vehicle, to wit: an automobile upon a high-
way within the County of Salt Lake, State 
of Utah, towit, in the 3500 block on High-
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land Drive; and that at said time that said 
defendant did not have a driver's license, 
the same having been revoked on the 14th 
day of June, 1938. Said charge was made 
against the defendant by a con1plaint sworn 
to by E. L. Jensen and filed before Arthur 
B. Bringhurst, the duly elected, qualified 
and acting· Justice of the Peace within and 
for the Third Precinct Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
''That thereafter the said defendant 
pleaded NOT GUILTY to said charge, and 
on the ·31st day of 1\Iay, 1939, said case was 
being tried before the said Justice of the 
Peace, and the defendant was sworn on hiR 
oath, and on said day was called as a. wit-
ness in said case, and at said time and place 
testified, while so undPr oath.. as follows: 
'I have not driven a car at any time 
since my license was revoked for 
drunken driving ' 
and said testimony was material to the is-
sues of said case, and said testimony was then 
and there untrue and not the fact; and thP. 
driver's license of the said defendant had 
been revoked on the 14th day of .Ju_ne, A. D. 
1938.'' 
(Signed) CALVIN W. RAWLINGS. 
Calvin W. Rawlings, 
DiRtrict Attorney.'' 
The question as to whether or not Spencer is guilty 
of the crime charged depends upon the fallibility or 
infallibility of the recollection of not only appel-
lant, but of Judge Bringhurst presiding over a 
court not of record and the materiality of the state-
ment alleged to have been made. 
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ST.ATEMENT OF ERRORS RELIED UPON 
This brief is written and filed after, but the appeal 
taken before, the new rules of this Court, in effect .. 
March 17 19-n) which do away with au abstract of 
the record and the filing, by separate document, of 
assignments of error. Assignments, however, have 
been filed and are included in the abstract of the 
record in this case. The abstract having been filed 
prior to the new rules of procedure, we assume that 
to reiterate the assignments of error would not be 
necessary. 
PARTICULAR QUESTIONS INVOLVED 
Whether or not the Complaint and the Information 
as amplified by the Bill of Particulars state facts 
sufficient to constitute a public offense, and whether 
the evidence supports the same. 
ARGUMENT 
Prior to the new code of criminal procedure adopted 
by the 1935 Legislature, it was necessary, by reasoP 
of 
Section 104-11-J Revised Statutes of 
Utah, 1932 
that the complaint before a committing magistrate 
must state ''the acts or omissions complained of as 
constituting the crime or public offense named," 
and by reason of 
Section 104-21-5, R. S. U. 1933, 
the Information must be direct and certain as to 
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''the particular circumstances of the offense, when 
they are necessary to constitute a public offense." 
Neither the Complaint nor the Information on 
file herein state the particular circumstances of the 
alleged offense nor the acts or omissions ·complained 
of. To merely charge that appellant committed 
perjury by testifying that ''I have not driven -a cai· 
at any time since my license was revoked for 
drunken driving" and particularly without stating 
the question or the circumstance under which the 
answer was given, is not a statement·of any offense. 
Under the Revised Code, the District Attorney could 
have been permitted to state the crime of perjury by 
reference to the particular statute defining such 
crime, or should have amplified the same by a. Bill 
of ·Particulars upon request, which was so made. 
The crime of perjury, according to 
Chapter 134, Session Laws of Utah, 1937, 
is of two degrees with specific and different penal-
ties for each. Appellant was convicted in this case 
of the crime of perjury in the first degree and yet 
neither the Complaint, the Information nor the Bill 
of Particulars stated the characteristic nature of 
the crime charged against him. 
'rhe demand for Bill of Particulars was as follows: 
"To the State of Utah and to the Attor-
neys, Calvin "\V. Rawlings and Eng-
ham E. Roberts: 
''Demand for a Bill of Particulars is here-
by made upon you for the following: 
''The date or dates and places or locations 
that the defendant, Sid K. Spencer, is 
alleged to have driven an automobile sinr(l 
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his license was revoked for drunken driv-
ing; the nan1e of the "itness or witnesses 
alleg·ed to have seen the defendant driv-
in.~· an automobile since his license was re-
voked; the questions asked the defendant 
and the answers given by him upon which 
questions and answers the defendant is 
charg-ed with having committed the crime 
of perjury. 
"Dated this 13th day of September. 1939. 
HARRY GOLDBERG, 
Attorney for Defendant.'> 
(Tr. 14; Ab. 5). (Italics ours). 
In the case of 
State v. Solomon, 93 Utah 70; 71 Pac. (2d) 
104, 
this Court carefully considered the purpose of a 
Bill of Particulars and while holding tha.t a Bill of 
Particulars need not be in the same nicety of forn1 
as heretofore required must, nevertheless, apprise 
the defendant . of the basic and fundamental thing 
with which he is charged. We quote from the iie· 
eision as follows: 
''The pleader had been too often held to 
strict nicety in stating the elements of the 
crime and the particulars thereof. The 
Legislature further intended to fully safe~ 
guard the rights of defendants by pro-
viding that the court shall direct the fil-
ing of a Bill of Particulars where the In-
formation does not give the defendant the 
particulars of the offense sufficiently to 
enable him to prepare his defense or give 
such information as he iA entitled to und~r 
the Constitution of the State." 
The Demand for a Bill of Particulars required n 
statement of the purported fiUestion asked by the 
county attorney, to which the purported answer 
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was made and this information was not given or 
supplied. 
Sometime ago, a book was written under the title 
of ''Respectable Sins.'' The book is out of print 
and is not presently availaole so far as the writer 
of this brief knows, but we quote from what we 
understand to be an excerpt fro;m. the same of a 
f?ermon of the Reverend John Watson, under the 
title of ''False Tongues:'' 
"Given a little skill, a little malice, no 
scruples, and anything can be done with 
facts. Allow me to select from among the 
words and actions of the best of men just 
what I choose and to use what I have select-
ed in a way I please, and I could make a 
man's character like that of Judas; I could 
poison the minds of his friends against him, 
and I could convict him before a jury of 
honest men. Just a sentence without the 
whole letter; just a saying without the cir-
cumstances; ju~.t an action without the rea-
son; just the text without the context; 
just some judicious selection and smne judi-
cious omission, and out of m:ln 's innocence 
you can create the plausible evidence of his 
wickedness. I heard him say it with minP 
own ears; quite true! But what else did 
you hear him say before and after? I saw 
him do it with my own eyes; quite true! 
But you do not say why he did it. There 
vr;;;; nothing on earth so mean or so cleve·r 
as the evil tongue working deceitfully, 
decently, politely. "What a course a single 
~lander mav run; and who is safe from the 
lig-ht, swift arrow~ of a calumniating 
tonguef Neither position, nor service, nor 
even character can afford to bid it de-
fiance.'' 
How can it be said that Spencer committed per· 
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jury without it being k11uwll ai lP<~~t Ull' lJUl'_iJ·:l'L 
of the question to which he is alleged to have n1adc 
the answer 1 Certainly, H' a Bill of ParticularH 
serves any purpose in this particular kind of a 
case, it should haYf' indicated the question and by 
whom and under what circumstances, direct or <~ros~: 
examination, propoun.d(~d. 
The record shows that this case was prosecuted at 
a time when ethical practices of an attorney of this 
bar were being questioned and with ·whom appellant 
wa~ allegedly connected in an unprofessional way. 
In re: l\1cCullough, 97 Utah 533; 95 Pac. 
(2d) 13. 
The record does not indicate what ultimate dis-
position was made of the case of the State of Utah 
&gainst Sid Spencer on the charge of driving an 
:tutomobile without a driver's license. It should bf· 
presumed, and we think that the fact is that the case 
has never been determined. With the ubnost of re-
spect to Judge Bringhurst, even thoug-h he may not 
be a member of this bar, we sug-gest that perhaps 
unwittingly he ff?ll into a situation analogous to the 
phHosophy ~o aptly expressed by the quotation 
above. 
CONCLUSION 
There are other assignments made and raised as 
to whether or not the evidence shows that appellant 
was actually driving the automobile in question on 
the date and at the time alleged in the Bill of Par-
ticulars. These assignments, however, while not 
waived, deal largely with matters pertaining to 
questions of fact. "\V e contend that the crime of 
perjury has neither been pleaded nor proven. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HARLEY W. GUSTIN, 
Attorney for Appellant. 
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